Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
W elfare reform, with its emphasis on moving families from welfare to work, has focused increasing attention on targeted income tax credits for low-income workers. Many states have added or expanded their modified versions of the federal credits. Twelve states now have earned income tax credits, and several have significantly increased their credit rates in the last few years. Eighteen states have state child care credits. Most of them are targeted toward low-income families. Unlike the federal child care credit, seven of the state credits are refundable. With the growing importance-and cost-of these state credits, it is important to re-examine their current and potential role in the overall system of income support and work incentives facing low-income families.
This paper examines Minnesota's recent experience with its earned income and child care credits. It illustrates the importance of evaluating such credits as part of the entire system, rather than in isolation.
1 The paper has two major themes. First, it makes the case for designing state credits that build on and strengthen-rather than duplicate-the federal credits. This may involve partially disconnecting the state credits from the federal credits, as Minnesota has done. Second, it illustrates how difficult it is to integrate state child care credits with other child care subsidies, including direct subsidies and pretax accounts. Throughout the paper, it is assumed that state tax credits are the last piece added to the system.
Tax Implications of Welfare Reform:
The Minnesota Experience
The existing state credits are compared to alternative credit structures to see whether states could better target this last bit of spending.
Minnesota's Tax Credits and Welfare Reform
Minnesota's version of the earned income tax credit, the Working Family Credit (WFC), was enacted in 1991 at ten percent of the federal earned income credit. It has been modified repeatedly since then, and is now one of the most generous of the state earned income credits. Figure 1 compares the Minnesota credit for a single parent with two children with those available in other states.
2 Six states (Vermont, New York, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Kansas, and Colorado) provide refundable earned income tax credits equal to a fixed percentage of the federal credit. Three other states (Rhode Island, Iowa, and Oregon) also have credits calculated as a fixed percentage of the federal credit, but their credits are nonrefundable. In those states, credits are only available to offset tax liability. Maryland offers its families a choice-a refundable credit equal to 15 percent of the federal credit or a nonrefundable credit equal to 50 percent of the federal credit. For a single parent with two children, as shown in Figure 1, Maryland's 15 percent refundable credit is larger if income is below $18,400. At higher incomes, the family would switch to the 50 percent nonrefundable credit. Minnesota's credit is also noteworthy for its unusual shape in Figure 1 , but for a different reason. In 1998, partly in response to welfare reform, Minnesota's credit schedule was disconnected from the federal credit schedule. All eligible for the federal credit are eligible for the WFC, but the size of the credit is now calculated using a separate lookup schedule. The rationale for this two-tier credit is explained below.
Minnesota's refundable child care credit is similar to those in several other states. First enacted in 1977, it adopts the federal definition of eligible expenses (maximum of $2,400 for one child or $4,800 for two) and applies the federal credit rates (30 percent phased down to 20 percent). But it differs from the federal credit in two critical ways. First, it is fully refundable. Second, it is completely phased out at an income of $32,050. Though there is some overlap in eligibility, most families who receive the Minnesota child care credit receive no benefit from the federal credit, and most who receive the federal credit receive no Minnesota credit. The structure of Minnesota's credit has remained unchanged since 1989, when the start of the phase-out range (but not its width) was indexed for inflation.
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Somewhat surprisingly, the credit has not been expanded in response to welfare reform, and its cost has actually decreased slightly in recent years. Rather than expanding the child care tax credit, welfare reform was accompanied by a substantial expansion in direct child care subsidies. Eligibility for these subsidies extends to 75 percent of median income (about 275 percent of the poverty level), well beyond the end of the phase-out for the state's child care credit. The cost of these direct subsidies dwarfs that of Minnesota's tax credit, and their structure varies greatly from that of any existing state or federal child care tax credit. As a result, the future role of Minnesota's child care credit is uncertain.
2 Credits shown are generally for 2000, but those shown for New York and Massachusetts apply rates that will be effective in 2001. Illinois also enacted a nonrefundable earned income tax credit in recent months at a 5 percent rate, similar in effect to Oregon's credit. It should also be noted that Wisconsin's credit for those with three children is more than three times as large as that shown in Figure 1 (43 percent of the federal credit rather than 14 percent). For a detailed history of Minnesota's earned income tax credit, see Manzi and Michael (2000) . 3 Eligibility has also been extended to two groups not eligible for the federal credit. Joint filers with a child less than one year old qualify for the maximum credit even if they care for their own child full time and have no child care expenses. Child care providers who provide care for their own children also qualify for the credit, based on the rates they charge for other children. The Minnesota Family Investment Plan (MFIP)-Minnesota's replacement for Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)-provides a unified payment of cash benefits and food stamps. For a single parent with two children, the maximum annual MFIP benefit of $9,468-about 68 percent of poverty level-consists of $3,084 in food stamps ($257 per month) plus $6,384 of cash benefits ($532 per month). Benefits are reduced by 62 cents per dollar earned in excess of $1,530 per year ($127 per month)-first cash benefits, then food stamps after cash reaches zero. Cash benefits reach zero-and the family is "off the clock"-if annual earnings exceed $11,800 (about 85 percent of poverty level). Food stamps are still at $3,084, for a total of $14,884. Food stamps then fall by 62 cents per dollar of earnings, reaching zero when earnings are just over 121 percent of the poverty level. As in other states, Minnesota's welfare reform also includes work requirements and a fiveyear maximum for benefits. Figure 2 helps explain why Minnesota adopted its two-tier earned income tax credit. It shows how disposable income would vary with earnings for a single parent with two children in Minnesota, assuming several hypothetical state earned income tax credits. Disposable income is defined to include welfare benefits (including food stamps) and earned income net of taxes and credits. Taxes include both federal and state income taxes plus the employee's share of social security and Medicare taxes. To focus on the role of earned income credits, Figure 2 ignores both child care costs and health insurance costs.
FEDERAL AND STATE EARNED INCOME CREDITS AFTER WELFARE REFORM
The lowest line in Figure 2 shows how disposable income would vary with income if there were no earned income credits, neither federal nor state. The second line shows the impact of adding the federal earned income tax credit (EITC) , but no state credit. The last three lines show the impact of adding state credits set at 25, 50, and 100 percent of the federal EITC. The slope of each line shows the change in disposable income per dollar of additional earnings, or one minus the effective tax rate. The poverty threshold for this family of three is $13,880.
The power of the federal EITC in helping this family work its way out of poverty is illustrated by comparing the lower two lines in Figure 2 . With no EITC (federal or state), it would take $11,400 of earnings to raise disposable income to the poverty level; with the EITC it takes only $4,925 of earnings. To get to 125 percent of poverty with no EITC would require $19,000 of earnings; with the EITC, it requires only $10,050.
4 Without the EITC, if this family earned just enough to leave the cash assistance program (still receiving food stamps), its income would just equal the poverty level. With the EITC, its income would be 30 percent above the poverty level. Figure 2 shows the downside of the EITC as well, though-high effective tax rates during the phase-out. The phaseout, at a rate of 21.06 percent, starts when earnings are $12,690. Having just worked itself off cash assistance, with income (including food stamps) at 130 percent of poverty, this family faces an effective tax rate of over 93 percent on its next $4,100 of earnings-91 percent on the next $2,150 and 96 percent on the following $1,950. Once off the food stamp portion of MFIP, the effective tax rate falls to 34 percent, but then rises to 49 percent between $21,500 (where federal tax liability begins) and $31,150 (where the EITC phase outends).
These high effective tax rates would be increased even further if Minnesota's earned income credit were calculated as a With a credit equal to 25 percent of the EITC, effective tax rates would rise to 96 percent and 101 percent over the critical $4,100 range. With a credit equal to 50 percent, the effective tax rates exceed 100 percent over the entire range. A credit equal to 100 percent of the federal EITC, the top line in Figure 2 , would raise effective tax rates to 117 percent.
Minnesota's Two-Tier Credit
During the 1997 session, Minnesota legislators voted to increase Minnesota's earned income credit from 15 percent to 25 percent of the federal credit, effective for tax year 1998. Before the higher rate took effect, however, several policy makers pointed out that this would yield effective tax rates in excess of 100 percent. In response, legislators chose to partially disconnect the Minnesota credit from the federal EITC, adopting a two-tier credit of the form shown in Figure 1 .
5 For a family with two children, the current Minnesota credit equals 25 percent of the federal credit with the following adjustments:
• The start of the phase out is substantially delayed (from $12,690 to $17,890); • A second tier credit (at a rate of 20 percent) is added for earnings between $14,860 and $16,800; and • The phase out rate is increased enough to limit eligibility to those who qualify for the federal EITC.
Figure 3 compares the current Minnesota credit's impact over the critical earnings range to piggyback credits at 25, 33, and 50 percent. As Figure 3 makes clear, the credit is effectively a 25 percent piggyback credit below $14,860 and a 49 percent piggyback credit above $16,800, and rises from 25 percent to 49 percent in between.
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Adding the second tier raised the cost of the Minnesota credit by about onethird. It now costs as much as a piggybacked credit equal to one-third of the EITC. As shown in Figure 3 , though, a credit equal to 33 percent of the federal EITC would mean effective tax rates in excess of 100 percent over a significant income range.
The redesigned working family credit replaced a simple calculation ("multiply the EITC by 15 percent") with a separate two-page look-up table plus a new onepage form with a page of instructions on the back. There were fears that participation rates would fall with the added complexity, and the number of participants did decline by about 4 percent in 1999. Replacing the simple calculation with a look-up table significantly reduced mathematical errors, though. (Multiplying by 0.15 is apparently quite difficult.) In past years, Minnesota has calculated the state credit and mailed checks to anyone who received the federal EITC but not the state credit. This process is now more difficult, though most who fail to apply for the working family credit are those with no children, for whom the credit is still a flat 25 percent of the federal credit.
The 1998 credit was a bit smaller than the current credit. The first tier credit for those with children was only 20 percent of the federal credit. Because this replaced the 25 percent credit passed the previous sessionbefore it took effect-legislators faced pressure to increase the first tier up to the promised 25 percent. In 1999, the first tier for those with children was increased to 22 percent of the federal credit. In 2000, it was increased to 25 percent for all households, including those with no children. 6 The pattern is similar for those with only one child. In that case, the credit is a combination of a 25 percent piggyback credit below $12,060 and a 36 percent credit above $15,080 (the start of the phase-out for those with one child). The second tier credit rate is only 8.5 percent, considerably lower than for two children, and it applies over a smaller range of earnings ($12,060 to $13,450) . For those with no qualifying children, the WFC is a straight 25 percent of the federal EITC. 7 The lower participation rate for the "working family credit" among single people without children may be partly due to the credit's name. The optimal design of federal and state earned income tax credits was almost certainly changed by welfare reform. If some level of work is now generally required, it may be less important to provide a large subsidy on the first $9,720 of earnings (those with two children) and no subsidy for additional earnings. States cannot redesign the federal EITC, though. In the short run, at least, states must treat the federal EITC as a given. Minnesota's experience suggests that states introducing or expanding their own earned income credits would do well to consider something other than a simple piggyback credit. It may be better to structure their credits to reduce the high effective tax rates of those whose federal EITC is phasing out while they still receive welfare benefits or food stamps.
Once a state has partially disconnected from the federal EITC, the credit structure can be varied as desired. For example, a state could provide a lower credit rate on the first $10,000 of earnings combined with a substantially higher credit rate at earnings levels where the combination of welfare and the federal credit's phase-out cause the most problems. Or the credit might not apply to the first few thousand dollars of earnings. Between the zeroearnings point and the end-of-EITC point on Figure 2 , the average effective tax rate is 54 percent. Opinions may vary about the optimal pattern of marginal effective tax rates between those two points, but it is unlikely such a pattern would include marginal effective tax rates near 100 percent over any substantial portion of that range.
Minnesota's experience also shows the phase-out can be started at a higher income for those with two children than for those with one child, despite the federal EITC's failure to do so. If an even higher credit is desired for families with three children, all that is required is an additional column in the lookup table. This method provides more flexibility than simply applying a higher piggyback credit rate for those with three children (43 percent) than for those with two children (14 percent).
With a decoupled credit, it may also be possible to reduce the significant marriage penalties that plague these credits. Doubling the starting point and width of a state credit's phase-in and phase-out ranges for married couples would be expensive. In Minnesota, it would raise the credit's cost by about 50 percent. Such a change would create marriage bonuses in some cases, and it would extend eligibility to many couples who are not eligible for the federal credit. Nevertheless, given the severity of the marriage penalties involved, some changes at the state level may be desirable. One proposal suggested in Minnesota would subtract the earnings of the lower-earning spouse when calculating the phase-out of the credit. The cost of such a change is relatively low (seven percent of the current credit's cost). It would increase benefits for about onequarter of married couples now qualifying for the credit and increase the number of eligible married couples by less than 10 percent.
Extending eligibility to those not eligible for the federal EITC would be a major step, though, and one that Minnesota has not taken. States currently depend almost entirely on Internal Revenue Service audits to check eligibility, so such changes may raise serious compliance issues.
In summary, if states are going to spend considerable amounts on state earned income tax credits, they ought to consider whether their financial resources can be used more effectively by following Minnesota's lead and partially decoupling from the EITC.
MINNESOTA'S REFUNDABLE CHILD CARE CREDIT
As described in the introduction, Minnesota's child care credit is refundable and is completely phased out at an income of $32,050. It is targeted primarily to those with incomes too low to receive the nonrefundable federal credit. Eligible expenses follow federal rules-up to $2,400 for one child or $4,800 for two children. Those filing for the Minnesota credit must attach the appropriate federal schedule even if they do not qualify for the federal credit. Credit rates decline from 30 percent (income under $10,000) to 20 percent (incomes over $30,000). For those with maximum eligible expenses, the credit is phased down to zero between incomes of $21,200 and $32,050. An additional $100 of earned income within this range reduces the credit by $5.30 (one child) or $10.60 (two children).
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The federal and Minnesota tax credits -and the combined sum of the two-are illustrated in Figure 4 (one child) and Figure 5 (two children) . The pattern for the sum of the two credits is somewhat bizarre. For a single parent with one child and $2,400 in child care expenses, the combined credit first falls from 30 percent at an income of $10,000 to 27 percent at $15,000, but then rises to 50 percent at an income of $20,000-25 percent each in state and federal credits. The combined credit then phases down to 20 percent at incomes of $32,050 or more, when the Minnesota credit reaches zero. For a single parent with two children and $4,800 in child care costs, the combined credit falls from 30 percent to 23 percent at $21,000, then rises to over 29 percent at $28,000 of income before phasing down to 20 percent at $32,050.
Designing an Integrated Child Care Credit
It seems unlikely that anyone would design a unified credit with this pattern. A better way to integrate a refundable state credit with a nonrefundable federal credit would be to redefine the state credit as an explicit add-on to the federal credit. In its simplest form, this alternative state credit could just fill in the federal credit "lost" because it is not refundable. In a more generous version, the state credit rate could be set at 20 percent plus three times the difference between the federal credit rate and 20 percent. The federal credit would be subtracted from the calculated combined credit. This would yield a refundable credit falling steadily from 50 percent state (under $10,000 income) to 20 percent federal (over $30,000). The phase out ranges could also vary with the number of eligible children. Although eligible expenses would follow the federal definitions, such a credit would increase administrative complexity somewhat at the state level. The tax filer would need to use a look-up table for the percent credit, multiply that rate times the eligible expenses, and subtract the actual federal credit. 9 The resulting unified child care credit would be more easily described, though, which might increase participation rates. This analysis to this point is misleading, though, because it has examined the state and federal child care credits in iso- 8 The phase-out between $21,200 and $32,050 is based on total household income, nontaxable as well as taxable. The start of the phase-out (but not the width) is indexed for inflation. 9 The method by which the non-refundable $500 per-child tax credit is calculated on the federal tax form would further complicate these calculations. Many families who show a federal child care credit amount actually receive no tax benefit. For example, a single parent with two children, $21,500 in income, and $4,800 in child care expenses would show a $998 federal child care credit on the tax return. But if the family had no child care expenses, its federal income taxes would be exactly the same! The $998 child care credit just reduces the family's per-child tax credit by $998. Such families receive no tax subsidy for child care costs. The calculations underlying Figures 4 and 5 show a zero child care subsidy in such cases. lation. The presence of other subsidies for child care has been ignored, and their presence significantly changes the analysis.
Pre-Tax Accounts for Child Care
Figures 4B and 5B compare the tax benefits of pre-tax accounts to the combined Minnesota and federal child care credits. Pre-tax accounts avoid the 7.765 percent social security tax as well as state and federal income taxes, and they are capped at $5000 per family, regardless of the number of children. This cap exceeds the eligibility limits for the tax credits, particularly for those with only one child in care ($5,000 compared to $2,400). For a Minnesota single parent with one child, such accounts become the preferred form of subsidy at incomes of between $16,500 (if child care costs are $5,000) to $28,000 (if child care costs are $2,400 or less). With two children, pretax accounts are preferred when income reaches $26,000 to $28,000, depending on child care costs. In the absence of a state tax credit, pretax accounts would be preferable at all income levels.
States should consider how the creation or expansion of a state child care tax credit may change the availability and use of pretax accounts. Pretax accounts have several advantages. First, the money is available in a timely fashion, not delayed until tax filing season. Second, employers pay no social security taxes on the amounts deposited in pretax accounts. Third, the federal share of the tax subsidy will generally be larger with pretax accounts than with tax credits.
Employers are not required to offer pretax accounts, but they are increasingly common. In 1999, Minnesotans received as much in total tax benefits from pretax accounts as from federal and state child care tax credits combined. Figure 6 shows how the use of pretax accounts varied with income in that year. Slightly over half of those with child care costs and incomes over $75,000 used pretax accounts. Only 20 percent of those with child care costs and incomes between $30,000 and $50,000 used pretax accounts.
10 State efforts to increase these participation rates may be appropriate, given the low rates among people who would gain from their use. Some have suggested subsidizing the employer costs of pretax accounts, particularly the startup costs for small employers.
In summary, states should consider how state tax credits affect the availability of pretax accounts. If state child care credits dissuade a substantial number of workers from using pretax accounts, smaller employers may be discouraged from offering them. In addition, as shown below, the move from pretax accounts to tax credits may shift the cost of the subsidy from the federal level to the states, with little net benefit to families.
Welfare Reform and the Basic Sliding Fee Child Care Subsidies
The existence of direct subsidies for child care also complicates the evaluation of state child care tax credits. In Minnesota, welfare reform has resulted in substantial increases in direct subsidies for child care, rather than an expansion of the child care credit. To this point, the analysis of state child care tax credits has implicitly assumed that parents-including low-income parents-were paying the full cost of child care. The presence of direct subsidies for child care can dramatically change the analysis.
In 1999, 36,000 households received Minnesota child care tax credits averaging $330, for a total of $12 million. That same year, about 27,000 households received direct child care subsidies averag- ing over $5,800 per family, at a total cost of $158 million. Half were families on welfare, who receive free or nearly free child care-paying five dollars per month if incomes are between 75 percent and 100 percent of poverty. In addition, any family with income below 75 percent of Minnesota's median household income ($38,000 for a three-person family) is eligible for subsidized child care through the the Basic Sliding Fee (BSF) child care program. The 14,000 BSF families-with neither cash assistance nor food stamps-received child care subsidies averaging $4,900 in 1999. On average, these families had 1.7 children in child care, and 18 percent had incomes above 200 percent of poverty.
BSF child care subsidies differ from the Minnesota child care credit in several important ways:
• For families with three or more persons, BSF eligibility extends considerably beyond the maximum income for the Minnesota child care credit -$38,000 for a family of three and $45,000 for a family of four, compared to $32,050 for Minnesota's child care credit • The average direct subsidy per child is four times as large as the maximum Minnesota child care credit per child • The BSF copayment for a family does not depend on the number of children in childcare, nor does it vary with the cost of that care. Increases in child care costs at the margineither more children in care or more expensive care (child care centers rather than family child care)-are in most cases fully subsidized. Parents are free to choose the most appropriate form of quality child care, without considering costs, so long as the cost does not exceed the 75 th percentile of costs for the same category of providers in the county, based on an annual survey • The phase-out of the subsidy (increase in copayments) is very slow at first. Given the magnitude of the subsidy, this results in very high phase-out rates at higher incomes. For a three-person household, the marginal effective tax rate in this program exceeds 30 percent at $25,000, 40 percent at $28,000, 50 percent at $32,000, and 60 percent at $36,000.
These effective tax rates are not stated in statute, of course, and legislators seem surprised by their magnitude. The statute sets copayments as a percent of income, and that percentage rises slowly and steadily from 3.75 percent of income to 20 percent of income as family income rises from 42 percent of median state income to 75 percent of median state income (the exit point).
11 Unlike tax credits, which subsidize a fraction of the cost of care, up to a maximum, BSF copayments are set in terms of the share of income a family "can afford to pay." Such differences make it difficult to integrate the tax credits with direct subsidies, unless tax credits are increased to nearly 100 percent of the total costs of child care.
Tax Credits, Pretax Accounts, and Direct Subsidies for Child Care no such tax breaks for child care, a $16,000 increase in earnings ($21,000 to $37,000) would increase disposable income by only $2,000. Existing tax credits reduce that 87.5 percent effective tax rate by only five percent, to 82.5 percent. (See line labeled "Include only tax credits.") The added value of pretax accounts reduces it to 80 percent. (See line labeled "Include both credits and pretax account.") When child care costs-net of all tax benefits-are included, effective tax rates exceed 100 percent between $13,000 and $15,000 (despite the two-tier earned income tax credit!) and between $28,000 and $31,000 (due to the phase-out of the Minnesota child care credit). The combined system includes two plateaus where the financial gain from additional work is zero, one at the poverty level and one at about 200 percent of the poverty level. The second of these plateaus still occurs even if child care costs are lower. Figure 7 also shows how disposable income changes if child care costs were $5,000 per year, rather than $7,000. The pattern is unchanged until income exceeds $31,500. The second plateau ceases to exist only if child care costs for this two-child family fall to less than $2,400, because direct subsidies would then end at $28,000 of income.
One Solution: Delay the Phase-Out of the State Child Care Credit
As shown in Figure 8 , the plateau between $28,000 and $31,000 would be eliminated if the phase-out range for Minneaota's child care credit were eliminated or at least delayed. Figure 8 shows the impact of such a change for this singleparent family with two children. With no phase-out, the effective tax rate falls by 10 percent over that range. (It should also be noted, though, that this plateau would also disappear if the state child care credit were eliminated.) This expanded credit would encourage families to switch from pretax accounts to the tax credits. A family with two children would find the credits preferable to a pretax account until income exceeded $50,000. Similarly, a family with one child would prefer a pretax account with income below $50,000 only if its child care costs exceeded $3,400. As Figure 8 shows, the net gain to this family is only about half as large as the increase in its state tax credit, because the pretax benefits were worth more than the 20 percent federal credit. Part of the "lost" benefit from the pretax account represents an increase in state tax before credit (at 5.35 percent), so the net benefit to the family would be only slightly less than the net cost to the state.
Low Participation Rates and Waiting Lists for Direct Subsidies
Not everyone eligible for direct child care subsidies receives them. There are two reasons for this. First, some choose not to participate because they view direct subsidies as welfare. The Minnesota Department of Children, Families, and Learning assumes that less than 15 percent of eligible families who have incomes between 200 and 275 percent of poverty and pay for child care will participate, even in a fully funded program. Although high copayments relative to net child care costs can partly explain this low participation rate, it should also remind us of one of the distinct advantages of tax credits.
A second reason for failing to receive these benefits is the presence of waiting lists. While full funding is provided for those on welfare (MFIP child care), the Basic Sliding Fee program has a capped (rather than forecast) appropriation. As a result, there are waiting lists for BSF subsidies in some counties. At the end of 1999, a total of 4,175 families were on BSF waiting listscompared to the 27,000 receiving direct subsidies under the two programs combined. A study by the Minnesota Department of Children, Families, and Learning (Kotilinek, 1999) has estimated that the cost of a fully funded consolidated system of direct subsidies, under current eligibility standards, will exceed projected appropriations in 2002 by 14 percent-a projected deficit of about $30 million. Possible ways to eliminate the projected deficit included the following:
• Increase copayments by "more than 50 percent"; • Lower income eligibility limits from 75 to 50 percent of state median income (from 275 percent of poverty to 185 percent of poverty); • Enforce a three year limit on participation by each family; or • Increase copayments by 25 percent and reduce income limits to 52 percent of state median income (190 percent of poverty level).
Another option was also discussed. If income limits for program entry were set at 50 percent of state median income while income limits for exit were left at 75 percent of state median income, with no change in copayments, the projected FY2002 deficit would be cut by 50 percent. Figure 9 shows the cliff that would be created by the last of the bulleted options for a single parent with two children and $7,000 of child care expenses. At $26,000, the copayment for child care is still only $2,050, even with the 25 percent increase. The tax credits do little to soften the blow of the increased expense, reducing the impact by only 14 percent (and only 20 percent even if there were no phase-out for the child care credit). It would take over $8,000 in additional earnings before disposable income recovered to the level before the cliff. Such cliffs are undesirable, to be sure, and tax credits can provide little help in cushioning the drop. But the waiting lists resulting from under-funding may be even worse. Those on the waiting list are receiving no direct subsidy, and surveys suggest that they are just as needy as those currently on the program (Schlick, Daley, and Bradford, 1999) . Only about 20 percent of families currently receiving BSF subsidies have incomes above 190 percent of the poverty level. Nevertheless, restricting eligibility using different qualifying incomes for entry and exit would seem preferable, even if it fails the test of horizontal equity and may encourage some to earn less in order to reach the entry income level.
The Uncertain Role of the State Child Care Credit
The problem posed by child care subsidies is a familiar one. A $5,000 subsidy phased-out over a $20,000 range requires adding 25 percentage points to effective tax rates that are already high. If the phase-out rate is kept under 10 percent for the first half of that range, it must average more than 40 percent over the second half of the range. If the effective tax rate is already near 60 percent-due to the phase out of earned income tax credits on top of regular tax rates-effective tax rates will approach 100 percent.
Child care tax credits provide no magical detour around these tradeoffs. Increasing the income at which the state child tax credit starts to phase out helps because it widens the income range over which the subsidy must be phased out. Though the direct benefits of such a change go to those with relatively high incomes, they make it possible to keep effective tax rates down without cutting the subsidy at lower income levels. Expanding the federal child tax credit-either the rate or the maximum amount eligible-would have the same effect.
Minnesota's direct subsidies for child care raise questions about the usefulness of the current state child care credit. If the goal is to assist families in the move from welfare to work, the Minnesota tax credit in its present form is problematic. It pro- vides little help to those receiving large direct subsidies, and it tends to reduce effective tax rates where they are already relatively low and increase them (during its phase-out) where they are highest. Some have suggested that the funding for this credit should be shifted to the direct subsidy programs, where it could cover roughly half the cost of closing the funding gap in 2002.
This paper has assumed that direct subsidies will provide the primary state subsidy for child care, with a child care credit playing at best a supplementary role. A more comprehensive analysis would consider structural changes in those subsidies as well. Economists can certainly envision replacing the direct subsidies with a generous refundable state tax credit. Timely payments might be possible through personal accounts similar to current pretax accounts. Such a system would try to take maximum advantage of the federal tax provisions. However, such a revised system is difficult to reconcile with some of the goals of the current Minnesota direct subsidies. Policy makers have chosen not to force low-income working parents to base child care decisions on the cost of care. The BSF program, in which copays are tied to income but are largely independent of the cost of care, would not be easily reproduced with tax credits.
SUMMARY
Minnesota's two-tier earned income tax credit illustrates how state earned income credits might be improved by moving beyond the typical piggyback credit. Because state credits are layered on top of existing welfare and federal tax provisions, these redesigned earned income credits have significant advantages and relatively small administrative burdens.
The role of state child care credits is more problematic. Measures to more effectively integrate Minnesota's refundable child care credit with the nonrefundable federal credit may be worth pursuing. State efforts to encourage more companies to offer pretax accounts are also suggested, and proposals to extend state tax credits to higher incomes should not lose sight of the impact this may have on the use and availability of pretax accounts. Integrating the state child care credit with the much larger direct subsidies for child care will be much more difficult. The phaseout of the current Minnesota credit adds to an already high effective tax rate for those with subsidized child care. If the credit's phase-out were delayed, this problem would be eliminated. Alternatively, the credit might be repealed and the funds shifted to help fully fund a consolidated system of direct subsidies.
The analysis presented in this paper again illustrates the complex interaction among these programs. Earned income credits, child care credits, direct subsidies for child care, health insurance subsidies for low-income families, the structure of welfare benefits: none of these should be considered in isolation. Effective policy requires an understanding of the system as a whole.
